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a b s t r a c t
This paper presents a comprehensive framework for the assessment of reliability and risk implications of
post-fault Demand Response (DR) to provide capacity release in smart distribution networks. A direct load
control (DLC) scheme is presented to efficiently disconnect DR customers with differentiated reliability
levels. The cost of interrupted load is used as a proxy for the value of the differentiated reliability con-
tracts for different customers to prioritize the disconnections. The framework tackles current distribution
system operator (DSO)’s corrective actions such as network reconfiguration, emergency ratings and load
shedding, also considering the physical payback effects from the DR customers’ reconnection. Sequential
Monte Carlo simulation (SMCS) is used to quantify the risk borne by the DSO if contracting fewer DR cus-
tomers than required by deterministic security standards. Numerical results demonstrate the benefits of
the proposed DR scheme, when compared to the current DLC scheme applied from the local DSO. In ad-
dition, as a key point to boost the commercial implementation of such DR schemes, the results show how
the required DR volume could be much lower than initially estimated when properly accounting for the
actual risk of interruptions and for the possibility of deploying the asset emergency ratings. The findings of
this work support the rationale of moving from the current prescriptive deterministic security standards
to a probabilistic reliability assessment and planning approach applied to smart distribution networks,
which also involves distributed energy resources such as post-contingency DR for network support.
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Traditionally distribution networks have been designed to com-
ply with prescriptive deterministic standards on the required level
of operational redundancy (see for instance the UK Engineer-
ing Recommendations P2/6 [1]). In this context, in the UK at 6.6
and 11 kV voltage level, networks are designed in a ‘‘ring’’ con-
figuration but operated radially, with radial feeders that can be
interconnected by closing Normally Open Points (NOPs). This con-
figuration guarantees that if a disturbance were to occur, alterna-
tive paths exist to supply customers not directly connected to the
fault. However, in order to allow this network reconfiguration and
reliable customer supply following a fault, distribution feeders are
typically underutilized. This also means that in the case of load
growth additional asset is needed, even if faults are a relatively rare
event, sometimes happening once every few years [2].
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2352-4677/© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access artGiven the new control capabilities enabled by advances on In-
formation and Communication Technologies (ICT), more effective
network assets’ use could be put forward. In particular, Demand
Response (DR) schemes could be enabled deploying increased au-
tomation to create self-healing capability. The US Department of
Energy defines DR as ‘a tariff or program established to motivate
changes in electricity use by consumers in response to electric-
ity prices or to give incentive payments to reduce consumption
when grid reliability is jeopardized’. DR has been categorized into
price-based DR programs (such as Real Time Pricing and Critical
Peak Pricing) and incentive basedDRprograms (such as Emergency
DR and Direct Load Control) [3]. In this work, Direct Load Control
(DLC) programs will be examined where customers sign up for a
contract giving the utility the option to remotely shut down appli-
ances and non-vital loads during high demand periods or power
supply emergencies receiving credit for this participation (as im-
plemented by utility [4]). In this respect, a practical scheme has
recently been proposed within the ‘Capacity To Customers’ (C2C)
project [2] whereby post-fault DR is used along with network au-
tomation, as illustrated in [5] with the aim to provide network
capacity release. In the literature, several DLC algorithms have
been developed. In [6], the DLC algorithm determines the optimal
icle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Indices
a Appliance group index
b Network buses group index
t Time group index
i Interruption group index
c Cluster group index
jr Responsive customers group index
jn Normal customers group index
R Residential customer type
C&I Commercial and Industrial customer type
Parameters and constants
VOLL Value of lost load
d Duration of interruption
CLDR DR capacity level
ϕDRb,t Binary indicator denoting if the DR action in bus b in
hour t has to be initiated
ξj Binary indicator denoting if customer j has been
called no more than twice per year
ψj Binary indicator denoting if customer j has been
called no more than 8 h in a raw
Variables
P jDLi Disconnected load of customer j in interruption i
IC j Total cost of interrupted load for customer j
IC c Total cost of interrupted load for cluster of cus-
tomers c
PRajR, b, t Responsive demand of appliance a of a residential
customer j, at bus b and time t
PRjC&I , b, t Responsive demand of commercial or industrial
customer j, at bus b, at time t
P_DRb,t Active responsive demand at bus b, at time t
P i
DLn,rj
Disconnected load of customer jduring interruption
i
Reliability indices
CML Customer Minutes Lost
CI Customer Interruptions
EENS Expected Energy Not Supplied
EICn,r Expected InterruptionCosts (DSOunreliability costs)
for normal/responsive customers
EICn+r Expected InterruptionCosts (DSOunreliability costs)
for all customers
E[IC jr ] Expected total cost of interrupted load for a
responsive customer
E[IC c] Expected total cost of interrupted load for cluster c
(P(utilDR)) Probability of DR utilization
(P(DRreq > X)) Probability of DR requirements overriding
DR capacity.
control schedules that an aggregator should apply to the control-
lable devices of a large number of customers in order to optimize
load reduction over a specified control period. A building energy
simulation tool is employed to model the average behaviour of the
thermal loads of each customer type. The controllable customers
are operated as a virtual power plant taking part in the electricity
market by offering load reduction bids to the system operator. In
[7] a DLC scheme of air conditioning loads (ACL) is proposed, aim-
ing to reduce the peak load, scheduling the cycling on/off times ofthe loads based on their interruption costs. The objective of this
DLC is to minimize the overall system operating cost comprising
the energy cost, the spinning reserve cost and the compensation
to the ACL customers. A novel adaptive control strategy for inte-
gratingDLCwith interruptible loadmanagement to provide instan-
taneous reserves for ancillary services is presented in [8]. There,
a fuzzy dynamic programming is firstly used to pre-schedule the
DLC and satisfy the customers’ requirements and then the adap-
tive control strategy further operates the interruptible load to ad-
just the DLC scheduling in real time.
Effectively, through DLC, DR customers accept a level of ‘differ-
entiated reliability’, where the system delivers different levels of
reliability to different customers depending on their preferences,
which are driven by the willingness to accept lower service quality
for economic benefits. A similar concept of differentiated reliabil-
ity has recently been presented in [9], proposing optimal switch
configuration algorithm for customers who pay additional fees for
higher reliability. The problem is formulated as an optimization,
which is performed off-line (storing optimal switch combinations
in a database to be used in real time) with the objective of mini-
mizing utility liability while assuring the supply of power to pri-
ority customers. From the above-mentioned DLC references only
[7,8] have included the power network constraints into the prob-
lem formulation and only [7] has examined the reliability per-
formance of the network including the DLC scheme applying the
analytical technique of state enumeration into a transmission net-
work. However, quantifying the reliability and risk profile arising
from application of differentiated reliability DR or DLC using prob-
abilistic techniques such asMonte Carlo simulations in current and
future distribution networks is a topic broadly unexplored.
Furthermore, the reliability impacts on power networks when
implementing demand side management techniques has been
already addressed by researchers. DR impacts on bulk system
reliability have been researched in [10]. The paper also considers
the load forecast uncertainty, while applying load shifting as a
demand side management measure. DR impacts on distribution
network operation have been discussed in [11] where for the
reliability evaluation a limited set of contingency states have
been considered. Load profiles for major residential appliances
are extracted from metre consumption and also the flexibility of
the responsive loads is also taken into account. Impacts of DR
programs on short-term reliability assessment of wind integrated
power systems is studied in [12] applying Monte Carlo method.
The outlined literature aims at quantifying the reliability benefits
when DR is activated. However, none of those articles discusses
the reliability implications of DR to increase the utilization of
the existing network and the potential DR capacity requirements
associatedwith this objective. On the other hand, [13] proposes DR
as an option to enhance the utilization of the current distribution
network capacity, but without doing any reliability analysis.
Therefore, it can be appreciated how little work has been carried
out in terms of reliability and risk considerations of DR resources
that would accept differentiated reliability contracts, whilst this
solution could bring substantial capacity support (and network
reinforcement postponement or even avoidance [5]) benefits and
is in fact already being trialled, for instance in the aforementioned
C2C project.
On top of that, any load reduction due to the DR scheme
would probably need to be recovered at a later time. This process
is characterized as energy payback [14] and is a potential side-
effect of intentionally reducing consumption. Although this effect
has been studied from an operational and a market perspective
[8,15], payback effects have been included in [7,16], but to none of
the above articles which are more related to distribution network
reliability with DR services.
Based on the above and following preliminary work carried
out in [17], this paper discusses the implementation of DR in the
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to release untapped emergency network capacity during normal
operations.
A specific modelling framework has been built for reliability as-
sessment based on Sequential Monte Carlo Simulation (SMCS) that
makes use of time series profiles, which are a key input to effec-
tively assess the DR requirements. The cost of interrupted load has
been used as a proxy of DR contract values and to determine a
disconnection priority list. Numerical applications to UK distribu-
tion networks from the C2C project are used to demonstrate the
framework, quantifying how the distribution network risk profile
changeswhenmoving from anN-1 preventive security to a correc-
tiveDR-based security context, and assessing the technical risk and
economic implication borne by theDSOwhen contracting different
volumes of DR.
Specific objectives of this work which also represent key
contributions with respect to the current research are the
following:
• Assessing the reliability performance of two DR schemes,
namely, the currently trialled C2C scheme (hereinafter indi-
cated as inter-trip) and the proposed smart DLC scheme where
during a contingency event DR customers are disconnected ac-
cording to the determined priority list. Selection of DR cus-
tomers according to their interruption costs has also been seen
in [7], however in that study DLC is implemented in the peak
load periods of every day, whereas in our study DLC is applied
only as corrective action after a random fault has been placed
in the network in a random hour of the year.
• Performing the reliability studies taking into account asset
emergency ratings, realistic load profiles, power network
constraints, payback effects and the cost of interrupted load. In
case of residential DR, detailed major appliance modelling has
been conducted which is necessary for residential DR, a process
only seen in [18] (though not including reliability analysis)
and in [11] (however the reliability analysis is performed
with state enumeration and not through simulation and time
series analysis which will be proven crucial). Furthermore,
distribution network reconfiguration following restoration
process has also been included in the study in order to
realistically reflect the reliability profile of the network. To the
authors’ best knowledge service restoration along with DR has
been presented only in [19], where again reliability assessment
has not been considered.
• Assessing the risk associated with contracting varying levels
of DR, and in particular fewer DR customers than required
if applying deterministic security standards. DLC DR is used
to provide capacity release after network demand has been
increased above the P2/6 limits and DR requirements are also
identified from the reliability and risk analysis.
• Performing a techno-economic analysis to estimate the ‘‘unre-
liability costs’’, borne by the DSO, for normal and DR customers
with differentiated reliability levels in different scenarios.
• Realizing that detailed load profiles simulation, time series
analysis and application of emergency rating effectively capture
the actual network capacity requirements in a contingency
period, concluding that DR capacity requirements are much
lower thanwhat the deterministic standards initially indicated.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
DR schemes, the construction of the priority list and the OPF
algorithm for the DR prioritized disconnections. Section 3 contains
the reliability assessment procedure and the overall methodology
description is given in Section 4. Section 5 demonstrates the case
studies and finally the conclusions are summarized in Section 6.2. DR model description
2.1. General description of the DR scheme andmodelling assumptions
In the context of this work, a DLC scheme similar to [20]
is adopted. In the proposed approach, the network is operated
beyond its security limits, thus serving a higher volume of load
demand; then if a contingency occurs a relevant amount of load is
disconnected to bring the network within acceptable voltage and
thermal limits. That load comes from DR customers1 contracted
by the DSO for emergency conditions. In this paper, the same
assumptions made for the C2C project have been considered with
the aim to assess quantitatively the proposed solution from a
reliability perspective:
• In the event that load demand is higher than the P2/6 baseline,
the DSO has contracted the surplus of load as ‘responsive’ for
capacity support. This load is controlled by the DSO through
ICT and after a disturbance automated actions open the DR
switches.
• DR actions are limited to two corrective interruptions per
contracted customer per year, of maximum eight hours per
interruption, thereinafter referred as DR activation constraints.
Those DR activation constraints apply to commercial and
industrial (C&I) customers. Although the C2C scheme has not been
implemented to residential (R) customers so far, necessity of DR
from R customers has been highly acknowledged [21] and decision
models for managing residential DR has been examined [22]
showing that realizing effective DR in smart networks is evolving.
Hence, in this work R customers are also involved. The above DR
activation constraints apply for those customers as well.
2.2. Inter-trip scheme for DR disconnection
Based on the C2C case, in the inter-trip scheme all DR load
is disconnected to prevent further system damage should a
disturbance occur, regardless of their location and current demand
(restricted by the DR activation constraints). This approach leaves
significant room for improvement as illustrated below.
2.3. Smart scheme for DR disconnection
To alleviate unnecessary DR interruptions, in the smart scheme
DR load is optimally disconnected by the DSO according to a
predefined priority list when the fault occurs. The scheme is
built on the assumption that the existence of higher automation
and control schemes could allow the DSO to individually control
each DR load. In practice, this could for instance be realized by
automation between circuit breakers and DR points, supported by
different measurements.
2.4. Priority list for the smart scheme
The cost of interrupted load is used by the DSO as a proxy to
estimate the value that DR customers put on supply and then pri-
oritize the customers’ disconnections according to those criteria. It
is calculated as a function of Value of Lost Load (VOLL), the latter
representing the value an average consumer puts on an unsupplied
kWh, thus capturing the customer welfare and their willingness to
accept the interruption. The use of VOLL to determine unreliability
costs has been seen again in the literature [23]. In addition, such an
1 Smart switches may be used so that only curtailable load is contracted and in
case disconnected out of the total customer’s demand.
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that the DSO might have to bear for disconnecting non-DR cus-
tomers (see Section 5.4).
The VOLL is expressed in £/kWh and calculated through the
Customer Damage Function [24] which for a specific customer
category maps the cost of an interruption against the duration
of an interruption. It is calculated according to the methodology
presented in [25] as a function of the duration of interruption and
is evaluated for different customer types for a set of interruption
durations. Since it is customer mix and system dependent, it is
calculated case by case. The values for Customer Interruption Costs
have been retrieved from [26] for interruption durations of [30
min, 1 h, 4 h, 8 h].
The total cost of interrupted load (IC) of a customer j for a set of
interruptions is calculated as in (1).
IC jn,r =
total interruptions
i
VOLLij

dijn,r
 · dijn,r · P iDLn,rj (1)
where d is the duration of interruption (hours), PDL is the
disconnected load (kW). Superscript ‘n’ is for normal customers
and ‘r ’ for responsive. Eq. (1) which is based on [24], gives the total
cost of interrupted load per customer for all the interruption events
experienced due to random faults generated in a sampling year,
calculated for each interruption as the value this type of customer
puts on the interruption times the duration of the interruption
times the amount of disconnected load during the interruption.
The expected total cost of interrupted load per DR customer E[IC jr ]
obtained from the SMCS process is used for the construction of
the differentiated reliability priority list and is essentially the
relation between Eq. (1) and the parameters of the contracts with
differentiated reliability levels. In fact, the value of E[IC jr ] is used
in our model as a proxy by the DSO to estimate the value that DR
customers put on supply, and theDSOuses that information for the
smart DLC scheme to prioritize the DR customer’s disconnection.
The priority list is created containing the DR customers sorted
in an ascending order depending on their E[IC jr ] values, either
individually or clustered in groups. In the case that customers
are clustered in groups, the available DR capacity of each cluster
is the aggregated responsive demand of the cluster’s customers.
The expected total cost of interrupted load for each cluster c is
calculated as E[IC c] =c customersj E[IC jr ]. E[IC c] values accordingly
are sorted in an ascending order to form the priority list.
2.5. OPF algorithm for the smart scheme
Objective of the OPF algorithm is to meet the network voltage
and thermal constraints with the minimum utilization of DR
capacity and DR interruption costs. Therefore, an iterative function
is implemented whereby an AC power flow is used to assess
the total DR level needed after a fault at a given time so there
are no network violations following successive disconnections ofDR customers according to the priority list. The cluster with the
lowest interruption cost should be interrupted first. The function
is repeated until either all DR customers are disconnected or
sufficient amount of DR has been deployed so as objectives are
met. However, following the DR activation constraints, when a
customer is already called twice in a year, he becomes unavailable
for any future call; when a customer is already disconnected for
consecutive 8 h he is automatically reconnected and becomes
unavailable for the rest of that particular call. Hence, customers
who are on the top of the list are called always first comparing to
those who are further down on the list, but their interruptions are
limited to a maximum of twice a year and 8 h per interruption.
Further, these customers are selected first as they bring a lower
interruption cost to the DSO (objective of the OPF): this should
be completely acceptable by the customers since they have been
specifically contracted for this response and they are compensated
accordingly. The OPF algorithm is presented in Fig. 1.
2.6. DR capacity levels
Initially the maximum load demand that the network could
accommodate if DR was used as corrective control needs to be
evaluated. Hence, load flow studies are executed to determine the
amount of additional X MWsuppliedwhenDR is introduced, while
network constraints andDR activation constraints are satisfied and
at the same time reliability of normal customers is not jeopardized.
The load X thus also corresponds to the maximum amount of DR
required at peak time.
The case that the 100% of that load X is responsive and is
contracted as DR is the base DR scenario. However, various DR
capacity levels (CLDR), representing the ratio of contracted MW to
the value X (in percentages of X) of the required DR capacity will
be examined. In particular, DR capacity levels from 0% to 100% will
be considered, where 0% denotes that no DR capacity is contracted
and 100% that the contracted DR capacity is equal to X . This study
thus brings insights into the implications that DSO could face if
deciding to contract less DR than nominally required, given the
rareness of faults happening at load peak times.2
2.7. DR formulation
Summarizing the model characteristics of the previous subsec-
tions, DR could be formulated assuming that it is dispatched to sup-
ply load in the form of load reduction. For the contingency hour t ,
2 This analysis may also be useful to assess the risk for DSO due to uncertainty
(1) in contracting the X amount of DR, (2) that part of DR is unavailable when called
upon to respond (for instance due to automation failure) and (3) around the actual
responsive load profile.
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P_DRb,t = ϕDRb,t ·


jR
ξjR · ψjR ·

a
PRajR, b, t

+
jC&I
ξjC&I · ψjC&I · PRjC&I , b, t
 (2)
where ϕDRb,t is a binary indicator denoting if DR action has to be
initiated, ξj and ψj are binary indicators denoting if customer j
has been called no more than twice per year and eight hours
per interruption, respectively. PRajR is the responsive demand of
appliance α of a residential customer and PRjC&I the responsive
demand of a commercial or industrial customer.
For each time step t , the amount of responsive load is capped
by the associated limit:
0 ≤
buses
b
P_DRb,t ≤ CLDR · X . (3)
2.8. Payback effects
Payback effects are analysed to realistically reflect the changes
in individual customers’ behaviour. For R customers, it could be
the turning on of an interrupted appliance and for C&I customers
the restart of an industrial machine or the rebooting of an air-
conditioning system to succeed the comfort room temperature.
In this work, payback effects are modelled as an increase
in the total demand. DR load that was curtailed during the
disturbance period is recovered in the period starting after the
customer’s reconnection. Following [15], an energy payback of
100% is assumed for R customers and a 50% energy payback for
C&I customers. Additionally, recovery period is assumed to last
maximum 4 h during which scheduled recovery is completed. It
should be emphasized, that the payback characteristics chosen
are for exemplificative purposes, discussing a general formulation
for load recovery, with the aim to fit in the wider implications
of the reliability assessment. Furthermore, either due to the
recovery period coinciding with high demand period or due to the
payback value itself, congestion could be introduced, jeopardizing
the network’s reliable operation when the system is intact.
Therefore, for payback effects alleviation the following strategies
are implemented:
• Inter-trip scheme: If network capacity is not sufficient in a time
slot of the recovery period, new corrective DR disconnection
could be triggered or even worse, normal customers could be
curtailed.3
• Smart scheme: Based on the flexibility that higher automation
allows, for each time slot of the recovery period that congestion
is created, an OPF similar to the one described in Section 2.5
is applied, preventing normal customers’ curtailment. Specif-
ically, the priority list is now searched from the opposite di-
rection giving priority on reconnecting DR load from customers
with the highest IC . In every time step of the recovery period,
the maximum number of DR load that network conditions al-
low is paid back. The residue of the DR load is recovered in the
next available time step.
3. Reliability assessment procedure
3.1. Distribution system operation under emergencies
A specific algorithm (illustrated in Fig. 2) has been developed
to simulate the actual distribution system restoration process.
3 Negative reliability implications for normal customers are a side effect of
payback and that bears constraints in the load increase (X value) that DR
implementation could allow.In line with implementations in C2C, remote controlled switches
exist in the quarterly points of the two radial feeders, and an
automatic NOP in the midpoint which interconnects the two
radials. Additionally isolators exist between load buses to isolate
potential faulted sections, consistently with real networks.
Following a fault, the relevant protections open to clear the
fault. Protection reclosing actions are then performed with the
aim of isolating the faulty circuit. After every switching action is
taken, the status of the rest of the switching devices is checked
in order for the next switching action to be performed. DR loads
are disconnected according to inter-trip or smart scheme. Apart
from that, the DSO may take other post contingency actions such
as pushing the system’s infrastructure to its emergency ratings and
curtail normal load.
3.2. Reliability assessment based on SMCS
Analytical and simulations approaches could be used for distri-
bution network reliability assessment [27,28]. In [29] amulti-state
availability model has been proposed, whereby all possible com-
binations of component failures are enumerated and associated
to a probability. However, this practice might result cumbersome
for large scale networks, complex automation schemes, inter-
temporal mechanisms such as emergency rating implementation
and payback effects, network reconfiguration and DR schemes, as
in this work. In contrast, the simulation approach simulates the ac-
tual system and components’ behaviour in a chronological man-
ner, allowing a high degree of complexity in systemmodelling and
capturing the physical significance of the calculated reliability in-
dices. Therefore, SMCS have been preferred in this work. The SMCS
simulates the system behaviour in a sequential order analysing the
systemperformance throughout a year. For every sample year, ran-
dom time to failure (TTF) and time to repair (TTR) are generated
for the components, using the component state duration distri-
bution function. Additionally, after a network line fault, time to
isolate (TTI) and time to switch (TTS) are generated. The former
represents the time to identify the fault, drive to the upstream iso-
lation switch location, and operate the switch; the latter represents
the duration of downstream switching actions. After having known
the chronological component state transition process, the system
analysis is conducted for every time step and annual reliability in-
dices are calculated. After the stopping criteria have been satisfied,
expected values and probability distributions are obtained for each
index. Additional theoretical background can be found in [30].
3.2.1. Reliability and risk indices considered in the analysis
In the UK, DSOs are obliged to report annually to the UK
Regulator Customer Interruptions (CI) and Customer Minutes Lost
(CML) and are subject to penalties or rewards according to their
performance. In this analysis, CI and CML, EENS and EIC (Expected
Interruption Costs) are the set of reliability indices calculated.
Mathematical expressions of the above indices canbe found in [30].
These indices will be presented both for the normal and the
DR customers in order to quantitatively assess their unreliability
discomfort from the service quality and reliability cost perspective.
Following from Section 2.4, EICn,r are calculated as EICn,r =samples N
N=1
n,r
j IC jn,r

/N and give the expected total cost of
interrupted load for all customers, known as unreliability costs for
the DSO. Consequently, EICn represent the DSO unreliability costs
for normal customers and EIC r represent the DSO unreliability costs
for DR customers and represent the costs due to load interruption
events. Interruptions could happen because of an unexpected
disturbance (if for example customers are located in the fault-
affected area) or because of a corrective disconnection initiated
from the DSO (intentional load curtailment). It should be noted
6 A.L.A. Syrri, P. Mancarella / Sustainable Energy, Grids and Networks 7 (2016) 1–12Fig. 2. Distribution system operation under emergencies.that EICn,r contain the costs for both types of interruption for the
customers. DSO unreliability costs for DR customers exclusively
related to corrective disconnections could be considered as
possible compensation payments to the DR customers (in reality it
is impossible to predict when a fault will occur), since they reflect
the worth of their interruption. The sum of EICn and EIC r gives the
total incurring unreliability costs for the DSO (EICn+r). These costs
provide possible reliability cost trade-off information to DSOs.4
Further risk indicators, illustrating the actual DR capacity
requirements and utilization are also introduced. These indicators
are particularly relevant to assessing the risk potentially incurred
by the DSO when contracting less DR capacity than the value X
nominally required. These risk indicators are the probability of
DR utilization (P (utilDR)) and the probability of DR requirements
overriding DR capacity

P

DRreq > X

, both measured based on
number of hours. Those indicators are calculated through the SMCS
process according to the formulas (4) and (5), respectively.
P (utilDR) = total hours of DR disconnectionstotal hours of disturbance (4)
P

DRreq > X

= total hours of normal customers’ curtailment
total hours of disturbance
. (5)
4. Overall methodology description
The proposed reliability and risk assessment framework is
the integration of the DLC DR scheme, the OPF disconnection
4 Besides these unreliability costs DSOs should also pay other (mostly fixed) costs
for DR contracts and automation. These costs should beweighed against the savings
from avoided infrastructure investment [5] and are not included in this study with
reliability focus.algorithm, the model of system operation during emergency
conditions, and the SMCS reliability analysis engine.
Two scenarios are further considered, depending on whether
post-fault emergency thermal rating is applied (TRemerg) or not
(TRnorm). In particular, as from DSO’s practical implementa-
tions [31], typical consideration for post-fault emergency rating
would allow additional loading of 20% above normal rating to dis-
tribution lines for 2 h.
The system state at every SMCS time step is simulated
through an AC power flow analysis, using Matlab R⃝and Matpower
4.1 [32]. Finally, to deal with the computational burden of SMCS,
simulations are executed with the Matlab’s parallel computing
toolbox and a high performance computing cluster [33]. The steps
of the methodology are detailed in Table 1 and illustrated in Fig. 3.
5. Case study applications
5.1. Network description, load profiles and other input data
To demonstrate the proposed methodology, a real distribution
network (Fig. 4) located in England North West has been used.
Current demand (which respects P2/6 standards) corresponds to
6.51 MW and 2.14 MVar. Network data for this ‘‘base case’’ are
illustrated in Table 2.
In this paper, half-hourly consumption of C&I customer types
have been retrieved from Elexon databases [34], where average
half-hourly profiling data for different days and seasons are
provided for eight Profile Classes. It has been assumed that the load
profiles for C&I customers are represented by Profile Classes 4 and
8, respectively. Fig. 5 depictswinter and summerweekday profiles.
For C&I customers, responsive load could be the whole load or a
curtailable non critical part of each customer load. It is defined as
a proportion of the customer load and follows a yearly load profile
analogous to the customer type. For the R customers, realistic
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Steps of the methodology.
(A) Inter-trip scheme (1st set of SMCS):
Step A1: Calculate VOLL functions. Initiate the SMCS process.
Step A2: Insert VOLL functions. Insert load point profiles for all customer types, customer and system data. Generate yearly sequence of system components.
Step A3: (Start with half hourly time step t = 1). If the system is in abnormal state, identify isolated points. Execute network reconfiguration, perform AC power flow. If
the system is in contingency, three hierarchical actions are taken until thermal and voltage violations are eliminated. If we are in the TRemerg scenario, lines are
overloaded for two consecutive hours after the corrective actions are initiated. If this is not successful, DR corrective actions are taken (inter-trip strategy) and if
violations still persist, load curtailment of normal customers is also applied. (Proceed to the next half-hour).
Step A4: If the system is in normal condition no corrective actions are taken. If t is the time step after a DR reconnection, energy payback is initiated and takes place
every time step of the recovery period. (Proceed to the next half-hour).
Step A5: Repeat steps 3–4 until the studied period (year) has finished. Load interruptions are recorded for every time step to calculate reliability and risk indicators of
every sample year. Repeat steps 2–5 for the next sampling year until SMCS stops.
(B) Smart scheme (2nd set of SMCS)
Step B1: Define the differentiated reliability priority list through steps A1–A5.
Step B2: Repeat steps A1–A5 inserting also the priority list in step A3. If DR actions need to be taken, or energy to be recovered the smart strategy is followed.Table 2
Network data for the base case.
Customer type (CT) Number of customers % of peak demand (PD) Aggregated PD [MW, MVar]
Residential 4443 63 [4.09, 1.35]
Industrial 24 11 [0.70, 0.23]
Commercial 306 26 [1.72, 0.56]
Total 4773 100 [6.51, 2.14]Fig. 3. Flowchart describing the overall methodology.profiles have been generated by the CREST tool [35] for each
individual customer, again for different seasons and days. The tool
generates random number of people per household and random
allocation of appliances indicating operation and consumption
of each appliance. For the heat appliances, the model presented
in [36] has been used to extract heat demand, using for less
complexity the same technology for all R customers, in this case
electric heat pumps. Load profiles for all customers are normalized
according to the load point peak demand. Fig. 6 demonstrates the
share of the major appliance groups in the total demand for a
winterweekday in a typical house. For R customers responsive load
comes exclusively from responsive appliances, whose operation
time and energy consumption could bemodified without affectingthe comfort level of their users [11]. For this study, for each R
customer involved, responsive appliances are the ‘cold’ appliances
(such as freezer, refrigerator), ‘wet’ appliances (such as dishwasher
and washing machine) and ‘heat’ appliances. Consequently, to
identify available R DR in each load bus, the responsive appliances’
demand for all the R customers of every bus is aggregated in each
time step.
The reliability data used for the study are depicted in Table 3.
The VOLL function for the different types of customers, after
taking into account the customers’ composition, allocation and
demand is calculated and depicted in Table 4. Table 5 presents the
maximum calculated additional demand that network can supply
in different scenarios, assuming that there is corrective DR (no
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Reliability dataa [37].
MTTF (h) MTTR (h) MTTI (min) MTTS (min)
Underground cables 175.200 5 – –
Switches (circuit breakers, NOP) 175.200 5 3 3
Mean Time to Identify the Status (MTTIS) of switching devices= 3 min
a ICT infrastructure supporting the DR scheme is assumed perfectly reliable. For ICT reliability impact
on the proposed DR scheme, preliminary work has been done in [17].Table 4
VOLL as a function of the duration of interruption.
Sector VOLL in £/kWh for duration of interruption of
30 min 1 h 4 h 8 h
Residential 8.56 5.23 2.93 2.1
Commercial 128.17 91.19 96.60 95.66
Industrial 520.17 352.78 300.22 244.68
compliance with P2/6) and normal customers maintain the same
reliability levels as before the increase. For space limitations and
as already described, only Scenario 5 will be illustrated in the
case study. Therefore, this 25% additional demand (1.6269MWand
0.535 MVar), which also corresponds to a maximum contracted
DR capacity X = 100%, has been assigned proportionally to the
different load buses.
5.2. Inter-trip case (100% DR capacity level)
This section illustrates the ‘‘inter-trip case’’. The reliability
performance of the test network is examined for the higher loading
condition (25% higher of P2/6 levels) but also for the current
loading without DR for comparison purposes (‘‘base case’’). From
Table 6, it can be observed that although the network capacity
has been stressed, normal customers experience the same reliability
levels as before. However, DR customers’ reliability quality is worse
comparing to normal customers. In particular, DR customers
may be interrupted along with normal customers when they
are located in the fault-affected area that becomes isolated or
get intentionally disconnected by the DSO as a corrective action.Fig. 5. Typical winter and summer profiles for C&I customers.
Fig. 6. Appliance level demand in a typical house (winter weekday).
Reliability indicators of DR customers are illustrated as ‘total’
representing their total discomfort, which contain both types
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Maximum load increase for different scenarios.
Load increase (%)
Scenario 1: No payback effects, no DR activation constraints +50
Scenario 2: Payback effects, no DR activation constraints +45
Scenario 3: No payback effects, maximum 2 interruptions of 8 h for all customer types +30
Scenario 4: Payback effects, maximum 2 interruptions of 8 h for C&I customers, 2 interruptions of 4 h for R customers +20
Scenario 5: Payback effects, maximum 2 interruptions of 8 h for all customer types +25Table 6
Reliability indicators inter-trip scheme.
Base case [CI:6.61 CML:21.76 EENS:1.28] Inter-trip DR case
TRnorm TRemerg
Normal customers DR customers total/corrective Normal customers DR customers total/corrective
CI* 6.61 9.42/2.85 6.61 6.61/0
CML** 21.76 25.20/3.54 21.76 21.76/0
EENS*** 1.28 0.34/0.0869 1.28 0.23/0
* CI (interruptions/100 customers-year).
** CML (minutes/customers-year).
*** EENS (MWh/year).Table 7
Reliability indicators-smart scheme.
Base case [CI:6.61 CML:21.76 EENS:1.28] Smart DR case
TRnorm TRemerg
Normal customers DR customers total/corrective Normal customers DR customers total/corrective
CI* 6.61 8.25/1.62 6.61 6.61/0
CML** 21.76 23.58/1.93 21.76 21.76/0
EENS*** 1.28 0.299/0.0426 1.28 0.23/0
* CI (interruptions/100 customers-year).
** CML (minutes/customers-year).
*** EENS (MWh/year).of interruptions and as ‘corrective’ which are only due to the
corrective DR scheme to quantify its share.
Furthermore, Table 6 shows how post-fault rating extremely
affects and improves DR indices. For this network, the bottleneck
in emergency conditions is thermal constraints, therefore the 120%
lines overloading for 2 h after the fault plays a catalytic role to
alleviate them. It can be observed that DR corrective actions are
eliminated. This is an important finding since it shows that if
emergency rating is a viable option under those circumstances, it
could replace or support DR corrective actions.
5.3. Smart case (100% DR capacity level)
The studies of the previous subsection are repeated for the
smart scheme. Cost of interrupted load for responsive customers
is calculated from the inter-trip case to build the differentiated
reliability priority list. Given the much higher value of VOLL,
industrial and commercial customers bring the highest cost for
the DSO if interrupted. Hence after a disturbance residential
customers are interrupted first, then commercial and finally
industrial customers.
To illustrate the methodology, customers are categorized into
five clusters which contain aggregated contracted capacity for
differentiated reliability DR of the following levels [20%, 40%,
60%, 80%, 100%] with respect to the maximum level X . For this
loading scenario, again there is no impact on the normal customers’
indices.5 Nonetheless, it can be observed that reliability indices for
5 For higher loading, normal customers are affected. In the inter-trip scheme
if due to payback, capacity limits are reached, they would have to be curtailed.DR customers improve for this scheme. Comparing Tables 6 and
7, CI reduce by 43.2%, CML by 45.5% and EENS by 51% (DR indices
due to corrective actions, TRnorm scenario), thus improving the
total DR indices too. In particular, the breakdown of DR utilization
(P (utilDR)) depicted in Table 8 for each DR cluster shows that the
probability to utilize large clusters of DR capacity is quite low. For
instance, the probability to utilize the 100% contracted DR capacity
is only 0.0021%. Likewise, it is extremely interesting to observe that
DR corrective actions in conjunction with TRemerg scenario become
an even rarer event (0% DR utilization for this loading level).
These findings highlight how the inter-trip scheme may result
in unnecessary DR disconnections. In fact, the amount of DR
capacity to disconnect as a corrective action crucially depends
on the location of the fault and the system loading level at the
time when the fault occurs. For instance, if a system disturbance
coincides with a period of low demand, DR needs are much
lower (or even null) relative to high demand time, as the healthy
feeder may have sufficient capacity on its own to support all the
customers after NOP closure. Considering time series profiles is
therefore critically important to highlight this aspect and truly
assessDR requirements. The only casewhen the 100%of contracted
DR capacity is interrupted is during a fault at the beginning of each
The same happens when DR activation restrictions have been outreached but
contingency remains. In the smart scheme, normal customers are slightly affected
due to the flexibility to disconnect different DR customers depending on the
situation, hence reaching later the maximum frequency and duration of a
customer’s intervention. In contrast, for the inter-trip scheme, indiscriminate
disconnections would lead to reaching the restriction limits faster, thus needing
additional curtailment.
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P (utilDR) For the smart scheme clusters.
Cluster id Aggregated DR capacity (MW) (%) of contracted DR capacity utilized TRnorm (%) TRemerg (%)
0 0 0 99.505 100
1 0.3253 20 0.1301 0
2 0.6508 40 0.1553 0
3 0.9761 60 0.1553 0
4 1.3015 80 0.0525 0
5 1.6269 100 0.0021 0Table 9
P

DRreq > X

.
DR capacity level (%) DR contracted capacity (MW) Inter-trip TRnorm probability (%) Smart TRnorm probability (%)
0 0.0000 0.258 0.258
10 0.1627 0.238 0.211
20 0.3254 0.195 0.164
30 0.4881 0.124 0.118
40 0.6508 0.044 0.084
50 0.8134 0.019 0.061
60 0.9761 0.016 0.041
70 1.1388 0.011 0.024
80 1.3015 0.007 0.017
90 1.4642 0.004 0.006
100 1.6269 0 0feeder and coinciding with the peak demand. Finally, emergency
rating implementation totally compensates and could effectively
replace the need for any DR scheme for this loading scenario.
5.4. Risk associated with DR capacity levels: Sensitivity study
As seen above, it is very rare that the capacity X is actually called
upon. Therefore, in this section, a sensitivity analysis is performed
for a range of DR capacity levels.
For lowerDR capacity levels, fewerDR customers are contracted
thus resulting in lower DR volume that can be disconnected
following a fault. In particular, for 0% DR capacity level only
normal customers exist in the network and no responsive load.
Reliability indices for normal and DR customers, for both types
of disconnection schemes and the TRnorm scenario are presented
in Fig. 7. Since all the indices follow similar trends, for space
limitations only CI are presented and CML and EENS are omitted.
TRemerg scenario is omitted, since for this loading level, the 20%
emergency thermal rating fully compensatesDR corrective actions.
The sensitivity study shows that reliability indices for normal
customers are worsening for lower DR levels because instead of
implementing DR disconnections as a corrective control, normal
customers would be curtailed to maintain the network within
thermal and voltage constraints (Fig. 7). To quantify this risk,
Table 9 presents the probability of DR requirements overriding
DR capacity P

DRreq > X

. When no DR has been contracted,
there is P

DRreq > X

of 0.258% that the DSO will proceed to load
curtailment for normal customers. It should be mentioned that
for load increase higher than +25% for the scenario under study
(scenario 5, Table 5), P

DRreq > X

for 100% DR capacity level is
higher than zero (whereas now is equal to zero confirming that
normal customers’ reliability is not jeopardized). Furthermore, it
can be observed that for DR levels higher than 30% (smart) and 50%
(inter-trip) (see Fig. 7), reliability indicators for normal customers
are slightly changed and this can be justified through the very low
P

DRreq > X

at those DR capacity levels.
Similarly, the DSO unreliability related costs are illustrated in
Fig. 8. For comparison purposes, the DSO unreliability costs for
the base case are also depicted in the figure. Results for the inter-
trip scheme are not included since they follow a similar pattern
with the smart but in a larger scale. It can be appreciated that
EICn+r are decreasing for higher DR capacity levels. In general, theFig. 7. CI as a function of DR capacity level.
cost parameters follow the trends of their associated reliability
indices: when reliability performance is improving, unreliability
costs are decreasing alongside. Interestingly, it is observed that
although EIC r are increasing for higher DR, the savings from
reducing EICn are more substantial thus EICn+r follows the pattern
of the latter. The smart scheme is a more profitable solution
since it results in 0.11% lower EICn+r comparing to the inter-
trip (DR corrective disconnections are fewer). Comparing now
with the baseline unreliability costs, by increasing EICn+r by 20%
the network could feed successfully 25% more demand, without
compromising the reliability level of the existing customers and
without any reinforcements (TRnorm) scenario, 100% DR capacity
level. Another interesting observation is that the share of DSO
unreliability costs related to DR compensation payments (referring
only to unreliability costs due to corrective disconnections of DR
customers) are quite low due to the rareness of the corrective
events (0.12% of EICn+r for 100% DR capacity level). The remainder
share of EICn+r corresponds to the cost of interrupted load in
the isolated area waiting for alternative provision of supply
(following Eq. (1) interruption costs are higher for higher levels of
disconnected load).
Based on the above findings, it could be concluded that the
smart scheme is a cheaper solution than the inter-trip scheme,
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while yielding to the lowest EICn+r for 100% DR levels. The
overall outcome is that increasing levels of DR capacity reduce
total DSO costs thus demonstrating the combined contribution of
automation and DR to reliability.
6. Conclusion
This paper has presented a comprehensive techno-economic
assessment of the reliability implications and associated risk
of using post-fault DR to release existing untapped capacity
in distribution networks. The solution relies on DR customers
accepting contracts for differentiated reliability and the inclusion
of fast network reconfiguration through high automation and post-
fault emergency rating. Energy payback as a side effect of DR has
been included in the modelling. DR activation restrictions have
been also considered reflecting the realistic assumptions posed by
the local DSO. The studies have been developed within a SMCS
framework, allowing the full use of time series analysis. An OPF
algorithm has been proposed for selective disconnection of DR
customers according to a priority list which reflects the reliability
worth that DR customers value their interruption.
An extensive quantitative analysis indicates that DR require-
ments might be (much) lower than estimated on the basis of peak
demand. From another perspective, if post-fault rating is imple-
mented, there is a zero probability of utilizing the contracted DR
capacity. Those results are in contrast with the conservative ex-
pectation for DR needs and the reason behind that is that network
disturbance rarely coincides with a period of high demand. With
DR the network could be stressed up to its maximum limits with-
out compromising the reliability comfort of normal customers and
without proceeding to network reinforcements, with a small in-
crease in the unreliability costs. Alternative, a full reliability worth
assessment shows the reliability implications, costs and their asso-
ciated probabilities when the DSO decides to contract less capacity
than indicated by the security standards.
Although the numerical results cannot be generalized, the
findings from this work support the rationale of moving towards
increased automation and control in smart distribution networks
and from an N-1 preventive security to a corrective DR-based
security context. Work in progress aims to extend the operational
model presented here to network planning in the presence of DR.
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